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Abstract According to Stalnaker’s Hypothesis, the
probability of an indicative conditional, Prðu! wÞ; equals
the probability of the consequent conditional on its ante-
cedent, PrðwjuÞ . While the hypothesis is generally taken to
have been conclusively refuted by Lewis’ and others’
triviality arguments, its descriptive adequacy has been
confirmed in many experimental studies. In this paper, we
consider some possible ways of resolving the apparent
tension between the analytical and the empirical results
relating to Stalnaker’s Hypothesis and we argue that none
offer a satisfactory resolution.
Keywords Conditionals  Probability 
Stalnaker’s Hypothesis  Triviality arguments
1 Introduction
Robert Stalnaker (1970) proposed the following as an
adequacy condition on any semantics for indicative
conditionals:1
Prðu! wÞ ¼ PrðwjuÞ;
for any u;w such that PrðuÞ[ 0: ð1Þ
That is to say, the probability of any indicative conditional
equals the probability of its consequent conditional on its
antecedent (provided the latter is defined). This thesis,
which is now commonly called ‘‘Stalnaker’s Hypothesis,’’
is generally found to have considerable intuitive force.
Thus Bas van Fraassen (1976: pp. 272–273): ‘‘[T]he Eng-
lish statement of a conditional probability sounds exactly
like that of the probability of a conditional. What is the
probability that I throw a six if I throw an even number, if
not the probability that: if I throw an even number, it will
be a six?’’ More strikingly still, in the past ten years or so,
various experimental psychologists have subjected (1) to
empirical testing, and they invariably found that their
participants’ judgments of the probabilities of conditionals
closely matched those participants’ judgments of the cor-
responding conditional probabilities.2
2 Triviality
What makes these experimental results particularly striking
is that they seem to run counter to David Lewis’ and others’
so-called triviality arguments.3 These set out to show that,
loosely stated, (1) cannot hold generally, and in effect can
hold only for very special, ‘‘trivial,’’ probability functions,
which have various features that make them unrealistic as
representations of people’s states of graded belief.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to review these
triviality arguments in detail. However, to provide some
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idea of how these arguments proceed, and also for later
reference, it will be useful to briefly go through Lewis’
(1976: pp. 136–137) first, very simple triviality result. Take
any Pr for which (1) holds, and let u and w be such that
both Prðu ^ wÞ[ 0 and Prðu ^ :wÞ[ 0: Then by the law
of total probability,
Prðu! wÞ ¼ Prðu! wjwÞ PrðwÞ
þ Prðu! wj:wÞ Prð:wÞ; ð2Þ
which, using (1), can be rewritten as
Prðu! wÞ ¼ Prðwju ^ wÞ PrðwÞ þ Prðwju ^ :wÞ Prð:wÞ;
ð3Þ
which further simplifies to
Prðu! wÞ ¼ 1 PrðwÞ þ 0 Prð:wÞ:
That is to say, for all Pr; u; and w that satisfy the afore-
mentioned conditions, it holds that Prðu! wÞ ¼ PrðwÞ.
This can hardly be true for every real person’s belief state.
Consider, for instance, that many would agree that it is
rather unlikely that Chelsea will not do at least fairly well
in next year’s Premier League, but that it is not so unlikely
that they will not do fairly well if they lose their six top
players. Apart from (1), the assumptions of the above
argument appear entirely uncontentious. So, unsurpris-
ingly, the standard response to the argument has been to
jettison (1).
3 Van Fraassen on the triviality results
But how, then, are we to make sense of the empirical data
apparently supporting (1)? The situation is quite puzzling
indeed: we have lots of empirical support for a thesis that,
it seems, simply cannot be true. One attempt to argue that
the tension between the analytical and the empirical results
is only apparent starts by pointing at an unstated premise of
the argument, to wit, that the triviality arguments take for
granted the assumption that the semantics of ‘‘?’’ is
independent of people’s belief states. To see how crucial
this assumption is, consider again the above argument, and
note that, without that assumption, the move from (2) to (3)
would be illegitimate. Rather than on (1) simpliciter, the
move relies on the following generalization of (1):
Prðu! wjvÞ ¼ Prðwju ^ vÞ;
for any u;w; v such that Prðu ^ vÞ[ 0: ð4Þ
However, those who want to leave open that the interpre-
tation of the conditional is relativized to belief states can
consistently hold onto (1) while denying (4). For the fol-
lowing claims are obviously compatible with each other: (i)
Prðu! wÞ ¼ PrðwjuÞ; (ii) where Pr0 comes from Pr by
conditioning on v, there is a conditional operator ‘‘!0 ’’
such that Pr0ðu!0 wÞ ¼ Pr0ðwjuÞ; and hence such that
Prðu!0 wjvÞ ¼ Prðwju ^ vÞ; (iii) it is not the case that
Prðu! wjvÞ ¼ Prðwju ^ vÞ (because ‘‘u! w ’’ is mean-
ingless in the scope of Pr0; and hence in the scope of
PrðjvÞ).4
This was first observed by van Fraassen in his (1976). In
fact, he did much more in that paper to challenge the
triviality results. In it, he showed that if the semantics for
‘‘?’’ is relativized to epistemic states, then there do exist
nontrivial probability functions satisfying (1), where ‘‘?’’
may be considered as logically well-behaved.
While he acknowledged van Fraassen’s point, Lewis
(1976:138) dismissed the possibility that the interpretation
of the conditional varies with people’s belief states on the
grounds that it would preclude disagreements about con-
ditionals. However, Lewis’ dismissal of van Fraassen’s
‘‘tenability result’’ is rash. Consider the sentence
There was a lot of snow in Amsterdam last winter. ð5Þ
People may disagree about what exactly counts as a lot, or
how exactly Amsterdam is to be delineated from the rest of
the world, or when winter begins and when it ends, and
therefore may interpret the above sentence in somewhat
different ways. By itself, that would seem no obstacle to
genuine disagreement about the sentence. As long as they
roughly agree on the said issues, one person affirming (5)
and another person denying it would seem to be in dis-
agreement. More generally put, if one person affirms a
given sentence which another person denies, then it may be
enough that their interpretations of that sentence are
roughly the same to justify the assertion that they are in
disagreement. Now, for all Lewis has said, the difference
between ‘‘u! w ,’’ where ‘‘?’’ is relativized to belief
state Pr, and ‘‘u!0 w ,’’ where ‘‘!0 ’’ is relativized to
belief state Pr0; may be no greater than that between
interpretations of (5) differing in the way just considered;
in fact, it may hold for any pair of belief states that a given
conditional has roughly the same meaning, whether it is
interpreted relative to one member of the pair or relative to
the other. So, for all we know, it is a mistake to claim that
if van Fraassen is right, no disagreement about conditionals
could occur.5
4 This observation affects all extant triviality results except the one
presented in Hájek (1989). However, the latter assumes people to
have states of belief representable by probability functions with finite
range. How restrictive this assumption is should not be overlooked
(pace Bennett (2003: p. 74), who contends that it is innocuous). For
instance, it would disallow us to model probabilistically the belief
state of a scientist who thinks the value of a certain parameter is to be
found in some interval of the reals.
5 See Hájek and Hall (1994:96) for a similar response to Lewis’
assessment of the relevance of van Fraassen’s result.
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To be sure, van Fraassen makes no attempt to show that
interpretations of conditionals relativized to belief states
are in general so related that apparent disagreements about
a conditional can reasonably be said to be genuine. (Nor is
the onus on van Fraassen to show this, it seems to us; but
we leave this question aside here.) Nonetheless, the data
about probabilities of conditionals obtained by Evans,
Over, and others might seem to provide some indirect
evidence for thinking that interpretations of conditionals
must be related in the designated way. After all—some
might say—that supposition would best explain those data
together with the data showing that people sometimes
appear to disagree about a given conditional. Be this as it
may, it would be overly optimistic to conclude that van
Fraassen’s tenability result has salvaged (1). In the fol-
lowing we present a new argument against (1) that is
compatible with the assumption that conditionals have their
interpretations relative to belief states.
4 A new argument against Stalnaker’s Hypothesis
The new argument assumes probabilistic centering,
according to which
Pr ðu! wÞ ^ uð Þ ¼ Prðu ^ wÞ; for all u and w: ð6Þ
It is worth stressing right away that this principle also
follows from the conditional logic underlying van
Fraassen’s result. In fact, it seems that (6) is hard to deny
for anyone committed to (1), for, given (1), (6) is
equivalent to the principle
Pr u! ðu! wÞð Þ ¼ Prðu! wÞ; for all u and w;
which would seem compelling on any account that permits
the nesting of conditionals.6 The crucial observation about
our premises is that jointly they imply the probabilistic
independence of a conditional from its antecedent, that is,
Prðu! wjuÞ ¼ Prðu! wÞ;
for all u; w such that PrðuÞ[ 0: ð7Þ
For, assuming (1) and (6), we can derive for all u such that
PrðuÞ[ 0:7





PrðuÞ ¼ PrðwjuÞ ¼ Prðu! wÞ:
ð8Þ
It is to be noted that this derivation does not hinge on (4),
nor is it otherwise open to the objection that it assumes
conditionals to have fixed interpretations across belief
states.
Van Fraassen (1976:278) remarks that (7) ‘‘might pro-
vide a new fulcrum for the application of a philosophical
critique or defence of [(1)]’’ (ibid.). To our knowledge, so
far no one has examined this possibility. This is surprising,
considering that (7) is deeply problematic. For, probabi-
listic independence being a symmetric relationship, from
(7) it follows that
Prðuju! wÞ ¼ PrðuÞ;
for all u;w such that Prðu! wÞ[ 0;
so that (1) together with (6) entails that the probability of a
factive sentence is unaffected by the supposition of any
conditional that has that sentence as its antecedent—which
seems plain wrong.
To see this, consider the following: Harry sees his friend
Sue buying a skiing outfit. This surprises him a bit, because
he did not know of any plans of hers to go on a skiing trip.
He knows that she recently had an exam and thinks it
unlikely that she passed. Then he meets Tom, another
friend of Sue’s, who is just on his way to Sue to hear
whether she passed the exam, and who tells him: ‘‘If Sue
passed the exam, her father will take her on a skiing
vacation.’’ Recalling his earlier observation, Harry now
comes to find it more likely that Sue passed the exam.
There seems nothing wrong with Harry’s response. Indeed,
it seems the natural response in the circumstances, if only
because Sue’s having passed the exam would explain, in
light of Tom’s testimony, why she bought the skiing outfit,
something that, by itself, had appeared puzzling to Harry.
In our view, this is a clear-cut case where, under the sup-
position of a conditional, one can rationally assign a
probability to the conditional’s antecedent that differs from
its unconditional probability.
Of course, this example only challenges (1) on the
assumption of (6), but, as we said, that is implicitly assumed
in van Fraassen’s tenability result as well. So, however
ingeniously that result may work around the triviality
arguments, it has not effectively salvaged (1). More gen-
erally, assuming that (6) is indispensable as a constraint on
the probability of embedded conditionals, the above
example shows that ‘‘?’’ will not really behave like a
conditional on any account of conditionals that keeps to (1).
Some might have qualms that our example involves
conditionalization on conditionals. As we see things,
however, dynamic intuitions on conditionalization are not
meant to be conceptually prior to static intuitions regarding
6 Given (1), the principle is equivalent to Pr ðu! wÞ ^ uð Þ 
PrðuÞ ¼ Prðu ^ wÞ  PrðuÞ; that is, (5).
7 See Hájek and Hall (1994:86).
8 For forceful arguments in favor of the view that intuitions on
conditional probability are primitive, see Hájek (2003).
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conditional probabilities.8 In general, assessments of the
first type are just a convenient way of reformulating
assessments of the second type, exceptions being cases in
which conditionalization cannot be soundly applied.9
When putting our example in dynamic terms, we assumed
that conditionalization would be safe in cases like that one.
But nothing hinges essentially on this assumption. Alter-
natively, we could have formulated the example in purely
static terms of conditional probability. If Harry were asked
the question, ‘‘Supposing that, in fact, Sue’s father agreed
to take her on a skiing vacation if she passed the exam,
would you remain as doubtful as you are about Sue’s
having passed the exam?’’ then there would be nothing odd
or problematic in Harry’s answering ‘‘no’’—or so we
suggested above, just in other words.
5 Escape routes?
There are more radical ways than van Fraassen’s to
respond to the triviality arguments. One is to side with
Adams (1975) in holding that conditionals do not express
propositions and therefore do not embed in other condi-
tionals or in the scope of logical connectives, and that
meaningful natural language sentences with the apparent
logical form of embedded conditionals have in fact the
logical form of unembedded simple conditionals, that is,
conditionals whose antecedent and consequent are both
factive.10 This allows one to stick to a version of (1) with
all variables restricted to factive sentences, provided one
reads ‘‘Prðu! wÞ ’’ as measuring some other quantity than
probability of truth (like assertability or acceptability). The
resulting thesis is commonly known as ‘‘Adams’ Thesis.’’
To see how it avoids our argument against (1), it is enough
to note that, on Adams’ account, (6) and (7) are both ill-
formed, because the terms on the left-hand side of the
respective equations are not defined.
We have two remarks about this. First, as Vann McGee
(1989: p. 485) notes, because of the mentioned restriction
to factive sentences and its inability to make sense of
Boolean combinations of conditionals, Adams’ Thesis has
been generally found to be of limited significance. How-
ever, it is hard to go beyond Adams’ Thesis while steering
clear of the problem we uncovered for van Fraassen.
Indeed, McGee’s own attempt to strengthen the thesis by
offering rules for computing probabilities for certain forms
of embedding conditional can be readily seen to fall victim
to the above argument as well. McGee’s result crucially
hinges on the import–export principle, which, again with
all the variables restricted to factive sentences, amounts to
this:
Pr u! ðw! vÞð Þ ¼ Pr ðu ^ wÞ ! vð Þ:
As an instance, we get
Pr u! ðu! wÞð Þ ¼ Pr ðu ^ uÞ ! wð Þ:
By the strengthened version of Adams’ Thesis that McGee
assumes, this yields
Prðu! wjuÞ ¼ PrðwjuÞ;
that is,





Pr ðu! wÞ ^ uð Þ ¼ Prðu ^ wÞ:
And this is enough, we saw, to place the argument of the
previous section in position.11
Second, while many philosophers take Adams’ Thesis to
be descriptively correct (even if limited in scope, as noted),
experimental results presented in Igor Douven’s and Sara
Verbrugge’s (2010) show that it is not: people’s accept-
ability judgments about conditionals do not generally
match their judgments of the corresponding conditional
probabilities.12 In their experiments, Douven and Verb-
rugge consider so-called inferential conditionals—condi-
tionals in which there is an inferential connection between
antecedent and consequent—and they differentiate among
three types of such conditionals, to wit, those in which the
inferential connection is deductive, those in which it is
abductive, and those in which it is inductive. Douven and
Verbrugge find that especially for the conditionals of the
inductive type, the match between acceptability and con-
ditional probability is very poor; the two are not even
moderately correlated. This should give pause to those
attracted to (1) who, under pressure of the triviality argu-
ments, consider a retreat to Adams’ Thesis: while there is,
8 For forceful arguments in favor of the view that intuitions on
conditional probability are primitive, see Hájek (2003).
9 See, e.g., Howson (1997).
10 A sentence is factive if it is not itself conditional in form and does
not contain a conditional.
11 Dietz and Douven (2010) provides still another argument against
(1) on the basis of probabilistic constraints for embedded conditionals
taken from McGee (1989).
12 A reference to personal communication with Adams in Hájek and
Hall (1994:77) makes it clear that Adams prefers to think of PrðujwÞ
as measuring the acceptability of u! w: Many authors state Adams’
Thesis explicitly in terms of acceptance or acceptability. See, e.g.,
Mellor (1993:233): ‘‘The Adams thesis . . . is that my degree of
acceptance of a conditional ‘If P; Q ’ is equal to my conditional
credence in Q given P,’’ where by ‘‘conditional credence’’ Mellor
means conditional subjective probability. See also Arló-Costa (2001,
Section 3).
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as said, a welter of evidence in favor of the former, there is
strong evidence against the latter.
As an aside, we note that Douven and Verbrugge
compared probability judgments with acceptability judg-
ments for a set of conditionals and found that, in general,
the two differed significantly. (In fact, they found that
people’s probability judgments for conditionals do closely
match their corresponding conditional probability judg-
ments, thereby offering further support to (1).) This rules
out what otherwise might have helped reconcile the
empirical results pertaining to (1) with the triviality argu-
ments, to wit, the possibility that the participants in the
various experiments about (1) interpreted the questions
about the probabilities of the conditionals as really asking
for those conditionals’ degrees of acceptability.
Finally, we mention that other frameworks that supply
sufficient means for circumventing the triviality results are
also committed to (6). In particular, we have in mind
Stalnaker’s and Jeffrey’s framework presented in their
(1994) (where the semantics of ‘‘?’’ depends on epistemic
states) and, more generally, conditional event algebras (see,
e.g., Milne 1997). As a result, these also face the coun-
terexample to (1) presented above.13
6 The approximation reply
At least some of the experimental psychologists working
on conditionals have been aware of, and have commented
on, the tension between the data about (1) and the triviality
results of Lewis and others. Most notably, Evans and Over
(2004) have argued that the triviality results are not really
incompatible with their experimental data. Specifically,
they claim that while the former show that (1) cannot hold
strictly, it does not follow from these results that (1) could
not still hold approximately. They even think that, sup-
posing conditionals to be propositions, and to have the truth
conditions assigned to them by Stalnaker’s (1968, 1975)
semantics—according to which u! w is true iff w is true
in the ‘‘closest’’ possible world in which u is true, where
‘‘closest’’ is supposed to mean ‘‘most similar to what we
take to be the actual world’’—‘‘people might often judge [a
conditional’s] probability to be close to the conditional
probability’’ (Evans and Over 2004: p. 29), so close, in
fact, that it is ‘‘hard to find a significant difference between
the two probabilities in an experiment’’ (ibid.).
However, it is a mistake to think that the approximate
version of (1) that Evans and Over envision is free from
triviality. Consider again Lewis’ first triviality argument
stated in Sect. 2. Even assuming only the approximate
version of (1), with ‘‘=’’ replaced by ‘‘&,’’ we get that, for
any pair u; w such that Prðu ^ wÞ and Prðu ^ :wÞ are both
positive, PrðwjuÞ cannot diverge widely from Pr(w). That
would seem problematic enough, inasmuch as this condi-
tion cannot plausibly be thought to hold generally for
people’s graded beliefs. To slightly modify an earlier
example, one may think it very likely that Chelsea will do
well in next year’s Premier League, yet think it very
unlikely that they will do well on the supposition that they
will lose their six best players. Admittedly, this is a rather
loose argument, which does not make precise the notion of
approximation or that of wide divergence. But no such
shortcoming attaches to Hájek’s and Hall’s (1994: pp. 102–
105) argument, which shows in a rigorous fashion that,
‘‘unless the standards of approximation are so weak as to
make the claim trivial’’ (p. 104), the ‘‘approximate ver-
sion’’ of (1) is no more tenable than the strict one.14
Even more relevantly, the observation that the data only
support the approximate version of (1) does nothing to
mitigate the force of our counterexample presented in Sect.
4. To see this, first note that assuming just the approximate
version of (1) would require that we replace the last (and
only the last) equality sign in (8) by ‘‘&.’’ So, we would still
have that Prðu! wjuÞ  Prðu! wÞ: Second, it is readily
seen that, like strict probabilistic independence, approxi-
mate probabilistic independence is symmetric; that is, for
all Pr, u; and w such that PrðuÞ and Pr(w) are both positive,
PrðujwÞ  PrðuÞ iff PrðwjuÞ  PrðwÞ . In other words,
supposing a conditional to hold should at most somewhat
affect one’s confidence in the conditional’s antecedent. And
it is perfectly reasonable to assume that, in our example,
after learning from Tom that Sue’s father will take her on a
skiing vacation if she passes the exam, Harry becomes
much more confident that Sue passed the exam (even if,
perhaps, he would still be rather doubtful that she passed).
But perhaps something along the lines of Evans’ and
Over’s response will work. In particular, it might be
pointed out that the triviality results all suppose that the Pr
function occurring in (1) (as well as in the approximate
version thereof) is a probability function in the strictest
sense. However, in the Bayesian community it is generally
acknowledged that no real human being has degrees of
belief that are representable by a probability function so
understood. It is presumably already false that the propo-
sitions (or, if one prefers, sentences) to which we assign
degrees of belief form what mathematicians call a field, but
even if they do, the degrees of belief we assign to them will
13 As an aside, we note that the example also puts pressure on the
material conditional interpretation of conditionals; see Douven and
Romeijn (2010, Sect. 2).
14 Hájek and Hall (1994: p. 104) actually present two triviality results
militating against the approximate version of (1): what they call the
‘‘Strengthened Lewis Result’’ and the ‘‘Perturbation Result.’’ The
reader is referred to their paper for the details. For a third triviality
result against the approximate version of (1), see Morgan (1999).
A Puzzle about Stalnaker’s Hypothesis 35
123
in general not be probabilities. For instance, we will not
assign probability 1 to every tautology. Also, an entailment
may not be evident to us, and as a result it may happen that
we believe the entailing proposition to a higher degree than
the entailed proposition. Presumably most of us should
expect still further inconsistencies in our degrees of belief
(inconsistencies from a probabilistic perspective, that is).
The best we can do, realistically speaking, is to have
degrees-of-belief functions that approximate probability
functions. Even though it may be hard to make the relevant
notion of approximation precise in a motivated way, it
might be said to be at least intuitively clear. It might thus
be thought that, rather than claim that their participants had
probability functions that approximately satisfied (1),
Evans and Over should insist that these participants, like
other ordinary mortals, had degrees-of-belief functions that
were only approximately probability functions and that
satisfied (or at least approximately satisfied) an analog of
(1) for precisely such functions, to wit,
DBðu! wÞ ¼ DBðwjuÞ; ð9Þ
where DB stands for a degrees-of-belief function of a non-
ideal rational person and that approximates a probability
function. It might further be noted that, in the context of the
kind of experimental work at issue here, this analog of (1)
rather than (1) itself is of interest: we knew all along that
the latter does not hold, for we knew all along that real
people (as opposed to ideal Bayesian reasoners) do not
literally assign probabilities to the various propositions
expressible in their language.
Unfortunately, this will not fly. Consider once more the
triviality argument stated in Sect. 2. If it is correct that real
people’s degrees-of-belief functions at best approximate
probability functions, then presumably we may not have an
equivalent of the law of total probability for non-ideal
rational degrees of beliefs. Much less can we generally
assume that DBðwju ^ wÞ ¼ 1; or that DBðwju ^ :wÞ ¼
0: Rational persons are not logically omniscient, and not all
instances of, for example, w ^ ðu ^ :wÞ may be easily
recognizable as being logically inconsistent. Note, how-
ever, that this does little to blunt the force of the said
triviality argument. For while the foregoing makes it rea-
sonable to hold that we do not have in general that
DBðu! wÞ ¼ DBðwÞ; we still do have this for each par-
ticular conditional u! w for which an equivalent of the
law of total probability does hold on our degrees-of-belief
function and for which we can easily recognize that u ^ w
entails w (such that, one may suppose, we believe w to a
degree of 1 conditional on u ^ w) and u ^ :w is incon-
sistent with w (such that, one may suppose, we believe w to
a degree of 0 conditional on u ^ :w). More exactly,
whether an analog of the triviality argument of Sect. 2 (or,
for that matter, of any of the extant triviality arguments)
can be run in terms of our non-idealized degrees of belief
for a particular conditional depends only on a fragment of
our degrees-of-belief function. If the relevant fragment can
be extended to a probability function—whether or not that
coincides with our degrees-of-belief function—it follows
from (9) that one’s degree of belief in the conditional
equals one’s degree of belief in the conditional’s conse-
quent. It is reasonable to think that, for many conditionals,
the aforementioned condition holds. However, it is equally
reasonable to think that of many of those we will be more
or less confident than we are of their consequent. The
example about Chelsea doing or not doing well in next
year’s Premier League may again be a case of point (at
least for many rational people).
7 Concluding remarks
In light of the foregoing negative results, the question of
what we are to make of the experimental data apparently
supporting (1) has only become more pressing. Must they
be reinterpreted, as showing something not about people’s
probabilities for conditionals but about some other quantity
related to conditionals? (But then, which quantity could it
be? Not acceptability, as we said.) Or should they be taken
at face value, supplying a reason to reconsider the triviality
arguments as well as our argument from Sect. 4 and to see
whether there are not still some assumptions underlying
these arguments that should be given up? We are not
currently able to answer these questions. However, it seems
fair to say that we have presented a puzzle that should be of
interest to philosophers and psychologists alike, and that,
we think, deserves much more attention than it has hitherto
received.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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Döring F (1994) On the probabilities of conditionals. Philos Rev
103:689–699
Douven I, Romeijn J-W (2010) A new resolution of the Judy
Benjamin problem. Mind (in press)
Douven I, Verbrugge S (2010) The Adams family. Cognition 117:
302–318
36 R. Dietz, I. Douven
123
Etlin D (2009) The problem of noncounterfactual conditionals. Philos
Sci 76:676–688
Evans JStBT, Over DE (2004) If. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Evans JStBT, Handley SJ, Over DE (2003) Conditionals and
conditional probability. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 29:
321–355
Evans JStBT, Handley SJ, Neilens H, Over DE (2007) Thinking about
conditionals: a study of individual differences. Mem Cognit
35:1759–1771
Hadjichristidis C, Stevenson RJ, Over DE, Sloman SA, Evans JStBT,
Feeney A (2001) On the evaluation of ‘if p then q’ conditionals.
In: Moore JD, Stenning K (eds) Proceedings of the 23rd
annual meeting of the cognitive science society. Edinburgh,
pp. 381–386
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Hájek A (1994) Triviality on the cheap? In: Eells E, Skyrms B (eds)
Probability and conditionals. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp 113–140
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